Russell had two theories of definite descriptions: one for singular descriptions, another for plural descriptions. We chart its development, in which 'On Denoting' plays a part but not the part one might expect, before explaining why it eventually fails. We go on to consider many-valued functions, since they too bring in plural terms-terms such as 'ͱ4' or the descriptive 'the inhabitants of London' which, like plain plural descriptions, stand for more than one thing. Logicians need to take plural reference seriously if only because mathematicians take many-valued functions seriously. We assess the objection (by Russell, Frege and others) that many-valued functions are illegitimate because the corresponding terms are ambiguous. We also assess the various methods proposed for getting rid of them. Finding the objection ill-founded and the methods ineffective, we introduce a logical framework that admits plural reference, and use it to answer some earlier questions and to raise some more.
Russell's theory of plural descriptions
Everybody knows that Russell had a theory of definite descriptions. Not everybody realizes that he had two: one for singular descriptions, another for plural descriptions. The contents of 'On Denoting' have blinkered the popular conception of his agenda.
The Principles of Mathematics
In the Principles class talk is plural talk: 'so-and-so's children, or the children of Londoners, afford illustrations' of classes; 'the children of Israel are a class ' (1903c, pp. 24, 83) . Readers brought up on modern set theory must beware. Russell's plural descriptions each stand for many things, and accordingly his classes are 'classes as many': they are many things-the children of Israel are a class-not one. (Unless, of course, they only have a single member. Throughout this paper we use the plural idiom inclusively, to cover the singular as a limiting case. Purists should read 'the Fs' as 'the F or Fs' and adjust the context to suit.)
Russell first investigates plural idioms in the chapter on 'Denoting'. His exposition is complicated, however, by his insistence that distribu-tive and collective predications need to be given different and separate analyses. To do this, he makes 'every F' do duty for 'the Fs' in distributive contexts, and makes 'all Fs' do duty for it in collective contexts:
I use all men as collective, i.e. as nearly synonymous with the human race, but differing therefrom by being many and not one. I shall always use all collectively, confining myself to every for the distributive sense. Thus I shall say 'every man is mortal ', not 'all men are mortal'. (p. 45 n.) This explains what would otherwise be a mystery, namely that his account of 'the notion of the' is confined to singular description. The reason there is no discussion of a denoting concept the men is that the pair of concepts all men (collective) and every man (distributive) have taken its place.
Russell's substitution of 'every' is harmless: 'Every inhabitant of Troy was killed' is equivalent to 'The inhabitants of Troy were killed' . But his other substitution is perverse, since the rule is that 'all' does not fit collective contexts.
1 'The Greek soldiers surrounded Troy' is fine, but 'All Greek soldiers surrounded Troy' is not good English. No wonder, then, that he fails to give a single example. Instead he resorts to the special case of a number of named things which he can list, as in 'Brown and Jones are two of Miss Smith's suitors ' (p. 56) .
His analysis of collective predication ('are two') is significant because it dictates a radical pluralization of the notion of the logical subject of a proposition: 2 In such a proposition as "A and B are two", there is no logical subject: the assertion is not about A, nor about B, nor about the whole composed of them both, but strictly and only about A and B. Thus it would seem that assertions are not necessarily about single subjects, but may be about many subjects. (pp. 76-7) In the next chapter he uses plural idioms to explain his notion of classes. It is here that he poses a question 'which is very fundamental in the philosophy of Arithmetic', and was to dog him for the rest of his time as a logician. 1 Remember that we are dealing with bare 'all' , not 'all the …' . The only exceptions we know of are cases like 'All men are created equal' , where the predicate is collective for the rare and peculiar reason that it does not even make sense in combination with a singular subject. 2 For the sake of the narrative we have cut out much of the relevant background philosophical logic of the Principles. It is set out in 'Russell's numerical conjunctions' , sect. 5.2 of Oliver and Smiley (2004) .
Is a class which has many terms to be regarded as itself one or many? … it seems plain that it is many; yet it is quite necessary that we should be able to count classes as one each, and we do habitually speak of a class. Thus classes would seem to be one in one sense and many in another. (p. 76) His immediate response is to exploit the distinction between the class as many and the 'class as one', the latter being introduced as a special kind of whole made up of the many items of the former. The distinction 'is often made by language … the army and the soldiers, the navy and the sailors, and the Cabinet and the Cabinet Ministers ' (p. 68) , where the first item in each pair stands for a class as one and the plural description stands for a class as many. This gives him an answer to his question. Classes as many 'are only many, and are not also one' , whereas the corresponding classes as one are 'only and essentially one ' (pp. 76, 68) .
Classes as one soon drop away because of the contradiction they generate, and in an appendix Russell argues by elimination of five rival candidates that 'the class as many is left as the only object which can play the part of a class ' (p. 515) . The fact that 'object' is being used here in a special sense covering both singular and plural, raises 'grave logical problems' (p. 55 n.; see also p. 136) and suggests that he is still flailing about. Eventually, however, he settles for the view that classes are really many and not one. They can be counted 'as though (sic) each were a genuine unity' , but this is only a special, derived sense of one (pp. 516f.). He rounds off the discussion by asserting:
The fundamental doctrine upon which all rests is the doctrine that the subject of a proposition may be plural, and that such plural subjects are what is meant by classes that have more than one term. (p. 517)
'On Denoting'
The denoting phrases of the Principles are reproduced en bloc in 'On Denoting' . In particular, its opening list includes both his substitutes for plural 'the men'-'all men' and 'every man'. 'The' itself is confined to the singular, just as it was before. Like the rest, sentences containing 'all men' and 'every man' are reduced to forms in which the denoting phrases do not occur. By now, however, the supposed collective meaning of 'all' has been forgotten and abandoned. 'C(all men)' now means the same as 'C(every man) ' (1905a, p. 44) , and is reducible to '"If x is human, then C(x) is true" is always true' (p. 43). If Russell had given a moment's thought to his discussion in the Principles, and tried out his pattern of reduction on 'Brown and Jones are two of Miss Smith's suitors', he would have seen that it cannot be right; but he did not. The upshot is that he avoids any serious engagement with plural descriptions. After all, 'On Denoting' is only a 'preliminary sketch', and the grammatical difference between singular and plural is played down as a mere matter of psychological suggestion (p. 43 n.).
Suppose he had taken plural descriptions seriously, and imagine an addendum to his article. First he would knock out rival theories that treated them as genuine terms. We would hear about the difficulties presented by 'The present Consuls of Rome are bald' and 'Beaumont and Fletcher are the authors of The Maid's Tragedy' , and how the meaning of the denoting complex 'the first two lines of Gray's Elegy' leads to an inextricable tangle. We would also be told that some cases may escape the net and be treated as genuine terms, plural logically proper names such as 'these' and 'those' when they stand for sense-data.
So far this is routine, but now he has to produce his own positive account, eliminating plural descriptions in favour of pieces of quantificational apparatus. A first thought would be a simple variation on his treatment of singular descriptions, reducing 'the Fs G' to 'There is at least one F and every F Gs' . This is fine as long as F and G are both distributive predicates, as in 'The sons of Mr So-and-so are bald'. It is a different story with 'The sons of Mr So-and-so are two of Miss Smith's suitors' or 'The men who wrote The Maid's Tragedy are bald'. We have seen that Russell was well aware of such collective predicates, and he would realize that the simple pattern cannot cope with them. Nor can a satisfactory account be given within his current logical framework, since it only contains singular quantification. He would need to add plural quantification. With F distributive and G collective, 'The Fs G' can then be reduced to 'There are some things such that every one of them and nothing else is F, and they G' . When F is collective, a different pattern of reduction applies: 'There are some things such that they F and no other rival things F, and they G' .
We said that Russell's arguments against other theories would leave room for some residual plural terms, the logically proper names. Now we can see that a successful Russellian elimination of plural descriptions actually needs the notion of a plural term, in the shape of plural variables to represent the pronoun in 'they F', 'they G' . In other words, the doctrine of the Principles, that the logical subject of a proposition may be plural, is demanded by an adequate treatment of plural descriptions within the framework of 'On Denoting' .
The role of 'On Denoting' in the genesis of Principia Mathematica
Russell's actual theory of plural descriptions is not at all like our imaginary addendum. As we shall see, it depends on the theory of classes of Principia Mathematica. Describing the gestation of that theory, he says: 'In April 1904, I began working at the Contradiction again … I tried to do without as an indefinable, 4 but failed; my success later, in the article 'On Denoting' , was the source of all my subsequent progress ' (1906a, p. 79) . And later, 'My first success was the theory of descriptions, in the spring of 1905 … This was, apparently, not connected with the contradictions, but in time an unsuspected connection emerged ' (1959, p. 79) .
What was this connection?
To answer the question requires a potted history of Russell's (philosophical) activities from 1903 on. He had already lost faith in both halves of the 'fundamental doctrine' of the Principles. In thinking about a sequel he had raised an objection which, if correct, tells against the very idea of a plural term (see section 4.1 below). Then too, the book's theory of types, though blocking the Contradiction for classes, could not solve a closely analogous paradox concerning propositions. It also drew a distinction between a unit class and its member, and introduced a null class, both quite at odds with his explanation of classes as many. Looking back on it all in the Preface, he confessed, 'I have failed to perceive any concept fulfilling the conditions requisite for the notion of class' .
The following period was dominated by attempted solutions to the Contradiction, whose only common feature is that none try to explain class talk in terms of plural talk and all steer clear of classes as many. In 1903 he told Frege of his discovery that one can 'do arithmetic without classes' by eliminating them in favour of propositional functions: 'this seems to me to avoid the contradiction' (Russell 1903b, p. 159) . As Frege pointed out, the idea is a flop, since Russell allows that a function may be its own argument, and the contradiction simply recurs for functions. Later he drew up a cost-benefit analysis of Zigzag, Limitation of Size, and No Classes theories, before plumping for the last (1906c, p. 164 n.). It contends that all significant propositions concerning classes can be regarded as propositions about all or some of their members … The method of substitution, by which I have proposed to effect this interpretation, is more or less in the nature of a technical device, to be replaced by a more convenient device if one should be discovered. The important point is merely to provide a mode of interpreting the ordinary statements about classes without assuming that classes are entities. (1906b, p. 200) The 'more convenient device' turned out to be propositional functions, though now (1908) governed by a Fregean distinction of levels that avoided the earlier objection, and this became the theory of Principia Mathematica. Shorn of irrelevant complications and using 'order' in the modern sense, it analyses the apparently first-order predication G( Fx) as the higher-order predication G(F).
Returning to our question, we can see at once that 'On Denoting' cannot be credited with being the inspiration for the elimination of classes, since that predated it by two years. (The article itself only mentions classes four times in passing and takes them at face value: see pp. 43, 46, 47, 55.) Russell himself tried to assimilate the Theory of Descriptions and a No Classes theory:
classes are in fact, like descriptions, logical fictions, or (as we say) 'incomplete symbols '. (1919, p. 182) classes … are 'false abstractions', in the sense in which 'the present King of England', or 'the present King of France' is a false abstraction. (1906d, p. 166) This is all over the place. In his search for a covering formula, he confuses use and mention in a way that is for once really pernicious. It is phrases, not things, that are incomplete symbols. It is things, not phrases, that are fictions or false abstractions. The theory of descriptions is not a No Kings theory. 5 The present King of England -the thing, not the phrase-was not a fiction or a false abstraction: he was an authentic concrete object, Edward VII in all his corpulent majesty.
To draw a tight analogy between Principia's contextual elimination of classes and 'On Denoting's theory of descriptions would be to commit a quantifier-shift fallacy. Principia eliminates every sort of reference to one particular sort of thing (classes). 'On Denoting' eliminates one particular sort of reference (definite description) to every sort of thing.
5 Cf. Neale (2001) , p. 135: 'Gödel thought some of the central difficulties of Principia arose precisely because Russell refused to admit classes and concepts as real objects. I suspect Gödel's worries about defining away classes by contextually defining the expressions that purport to refer to them may have clouded his thinking about contextually defining descriptions. There is an important ontological difference: contextually defining class expressions gave Russell a way of defining away classes themselves (so to speak); contextually defining descriptions gave him a way of defining away the king of France and the round square (so to speak) but it did not give him a way of defining away objects. ' x Since in fact they are doing different jobs, it is no surprise that the supporting arguments are also different: 'in the case of descriptions, it was possible to prove that they are incomplete symbols. In the case of classes, we do not know of any equally definite proof ' (Whitehead and Russell 1910, p. 75) . Had they been doing the same job, the arguments would have been the same. Just as we hear (pp. 69-71) about the difficulties presented by 'the round square' and 'Scott is the author of Waverley', we would have heard about ' (x x)' and 'Ø = (x wrote Slawkenburgius on Noses)' . As a result, a class abstract (x)-'the class determined by '-would have been treated in the same way as 'On Denoting' treats descriptions in general, except that the 'at most one' clause would not be needed because it is axiomatic of classes. This treatment of class abstracts is indeed just what we find in the manuscript 'On Fundamentals', written immediately before 'On Denoting', where (x) is treated in tandem with x(x) (1905b, sect. 41).
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The influence of 'On Denoting' on and after the development of Principia is undeniable, but it was a matter of stimulus and change of worldview. Its immediate effect was a revival of interest and confidence in the possibility of eliminating classes. Within four months he had mooted a new version of the abandoned 'substitutional' No Classes theory (1906c), and after two more he felt 'hardly any doubt that [it] affords the complete solution of all the difficulties' (1906c, p. 164 n.). The 'unsuspected connection' between the new theory of denoting and the new theory of classes is that each eliminates some expressions that 'inevitably suggest[s] the existence of something denoted ' (1906c, p. 155) . Anything stronger is ruled out by the differences described above.
The other effect was Russell's Pauline conversion to a conspiracy theory that has linguistic appearances generally misleading about the make-up of reality-an intoxicating revelation that led him to believe that 'practically all traditional metaphysics is filled with mistakes due to bad grammar ' (1918, p. 269) , and turned him into an eliminaholic. 7 6 It is thus extraordinary that the otherwise admirable editor of the fourth volume of Russell's Collected Papers should think that 'On Fundamentals' contains not only the basic ideas of the theory of descriptions but also those of 'the contextual elimination of classes' which 'led to the treatment of classes as incomplete symbols in Principia Mathematica' (Urquhart 1994, pp. 359, xxxv) . This is a howler. 'On Fundamentals' has nothing to do with eliminating classes. Indeed the first assertion of the relevant sect. 41 is that every propositional function determines a class. 7 He was not the only one to be affected. People are attracted to conspiracy theories, and much of the popular appeal of 'On Denoting' lies in its 'somewhat incredible interpretation' (1905a, p. 44) of its subject matter. On the debit side, a conspiracy theory of logical form provides an excuse for lazy or impatient disregard for the workings of natural languages. On the other hand it creates job opportunities: if things aren't really as they appear, philosophers have work to do by saying how they really are.
The predicative theory of plural descriptions Now, finally, Russell's theory of plural descriptions. In his Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, he devotes two chapters to the. The first is entitled 'Descriptions' and deals with 'the in the singular' . The second is entitled 'Classes' and tackles 'the in the plural: the inhabitants of London, the sons of rich men, and so on. In other words, we shall be concerned with classes ' (1919, p. 181) . He is summarizing Principia Mathematica, which makes exactly the same comparison between singular and plural the:
is used in our symbolism in such a way that it can always be read as 'the x which satisfies ' …The symbol should be compared and contrasted with ' (x)' which in use can always be read as 'the x's which satisfy '. (Whitehead and Russell 1910, p. 31) Indeed, Whitehead and Russell constantly treat class talk and plural talk as interchangeable, both in definitions and illustrations. For example, the class of terms which have the relation R to a given term y are called the referents of y, and the class of terms to which a given term x has the relation R are called the relata of x … Thus taking R to be the relation of parent and child, (xRy) = the parents of y and (xRy) = the children of x. 8 and, dealing with the 'very important idea' of 'plural descriptive functions' , we now introduce the notation 'R"␤' to mean 'the terms which have the relation R to members of ␤' … Generally, R"␤ is the class of those referents which have relata that are members of ␤ … sin"␣ will be the sines of the various members of ␣ … the fathers of the children of wise fathers are the class of wise fathers. (pp. 293, 315, 463) Although this equation of plural talk and class talk goes back to The Principles of Mathematics, the relationship between the two is now quite different from the earlier account. There plural idioms were first independently analysed, then used to explain talk of classes. In Principia, there is no prior analysis of plural idioms and no explanatory connection. The equation between plural descriptions and class symbols is simply taken for granted. Given this, and the elimination of class symbols in favour of talk of propositional functions, the result is that a plural predication 'the Fs G' is analysed as a higher-order predication 'G(F)'. On analysis, plural descriptions turn out to function as predicates. 9 Call it the predicative theory of plural descriptions.
8 Pp. 255f., with their typographically difficult superscript notation replaced by their own definition of it. 9 Compare Dummett: 'a plural noun phrase, even when preceded by the definite article, cannot be functioning analogously to a singular term … it is only as referring to a concept that a plural Every English predicate that can go with a singular description can go with a plural one too. So the predicative theory must say that the predicate is in fact two: when it combines with a singular description it is first-level, when it combines with a plural description it is secondlevel. But no one predicate can be of both levels.
The predicative theory is unacceptable, then, since it makes plainly univocal expressions equivocal. If you ask 'Who wrote The Maid's Tragedy?', believing it to have been written by one man, you may be surprised to be told 'The authors of A King and No King', but you won't treat the reply as an answer to a different question, as you would if 'wrote' were equivocal. If you don't know how many there were, you may say 'the killer or killers escaped' . If 'escaped' is really equivocal, this ought to produce an incongruous effect. It would be a case of syllepsis or zeugma, where a single occurrence of a phrase with different meanings does double duty: compare 'went straight home, in a flood of tears and a sedan chair'. But, unlike the example from Dickens, there is no shadow of incongruity here, and so no evidence of equivocal usage.
Univocity of predicates is also needed for the validity of arguments. We give two kinds of examples, one involving distributive predicates, the other involving collective predicates.
(1) From 'Whitehead smoked and Russell smoked' one can infer 'The authors of Principia smoked' .
(2) Candyland: A Novel in Two Parts presents itself as written by Ed McBain and Evan Hunter. Just from reading the book, you would surely say 'The authors of Candyland wrote in quite different styles' , since you would never know that they were the same man, Evan Hunter. But now you can correctly infer 'Evan Hunter wrote in quite different styles'. Or suppose you read three textbooks. One states that the Axiom of Choice implies P, another that the Multiplicative Axiom implies Q, and the third that P and Q together imply R. You assert 'The axioms imply R' . The teacher points out that the Multiplicative Axiom is the Axiom of Choice, and so you rightly conclude 'The Axiom of Choice implies R' . 10 10 A version of this argument was first used to show that Boolos's representation of plurals within second-order logic is fatally flawed, since he too must find equivocity everywhere. See Oliver (2000, p. 872).
phrase can be understood, because only a concept-word admits a plural. But to say that it refers to a concept is to say that, under a correct analysis, the phrase is seen to figure predicatively ' (1991, p. 93) . He imputes this predicative analysis to Frege, but in fact Frege said no such thing (see Oliver 1994, and Oliver and Smiley 2001, pp. 292-3) . In Dummett's text, for 'Fregean' semantics read 'Whitehead and Russell's' In both cases, however, the predicative theory detects the fallacy of equivocation. In (1), the plural predicate in the conclusion is secondlevel, while the singular predicate in the premiss is first-level. Similarly in (2), but the other way round. The plural predicate cannot be forced down a level, so the only way to preserve validity is to force the singular predicate up. Yet this is utterly implausible: it would require denying that any predicate can really apply to singular terms.
We need to treat plural descriptions as subjects, not predicates, and so return to the doctrine of the Principles that a term may stand for more than one thing.
Plural terms and many-valued functions
Though Russell's two theories are completely different in form and rationale, the territory itself cannot be neatly divided into singular and plural. For the two kinds of description can be intertwined via nesting of arbitrary complexity: 'the parents of the son of Mr So-and-so' (singular within plural), Russell's own 'the number of the inhabitants of London' (plural within singular; 1918, p. 243), and so on through Rolf Harris's 'the fascinating witches who put the scintillating stitches in the britches of the boys who put the powder on the noses of the faces of the ladies of the harem of the court of King Caractacus'. Descriptions of both kinds need to be treated simultaneously if one is to have an adequate theory of either. This phenomenon of nesting is characteristic of and generated by functions, and nested functions are essential to mathematics.
11 A comprehensive theory of descriptions must be able to deal both with plain descriptions ('the man' , 'the men') and those generated by functions ('the square of 4' , 'the square roots of 4').
In Oliver and Smiley (2004, sect. 4 .1), we make the case for admitting a category of genuine plural terms to stand alongside singular terms. A plural term is a plural noun phrase that purports to stand for some definite individuals (it may in fact be empty). Examples are plural proper namesOur main concern in this paper is with functional value terms ('functional terms' or 'value terms' for short). This is our label for expressions that result from applying a functor to its argument term. Functors may be primitive or descriptive ('ͱ', 'the square roots of '). Readers of 'On Denoting' will notice that almost all its descriptions are actually value terms of descriptive functors ('the King of ', 'the author of ' , etc). While these value terms are singular, others are plural: 'ͱ4' and 'the square roots of 4' both stand for 2 and -2.
Linguistic functors express worldly functions. A functor whose value terms are singular expresses a single-valued function, that is, one which always produces at most one value. A functor whose value terms are plural typically expresses a many-valued function, that is, one which sometimes produces more than one value (not necessarily always, e.g. ͱ0=0). Like single-valued functions, many-valued functions may be partial (consider sin Ϫ1 2, or the even factors of 3). Many-valued functions are rife in mathematics. Besides square roots, cube roots, etc, there are the inverse trigonometric and hyperbolic functions, and numerous functions of complex numbers such as the logarithm and the exponential. Mathematics expresses them by both primitive and descriptive functors: 'log ' , 'the prime factors of ', ' ½ ', 'the members of '. Non-mathematical examples are often expressed using the genitive followed by a common noun or noun phrase, as in 'Henry VIII's wives' or 'Euler's great discoveries'. These genitive constructions should be distinguished from their descriptive counterparts ('the wives of Henry VIII').
So far we have only mentioned 1-place functors, which combine with just one argument term. These express 1-place functions. We shall also speak of n-place functors and functions.
A functor may combine with plural argument terms, as in 'the twins' father' and 'the hcf of the even numbers'. The corresponding function will typically be multigrade in the sense that it can take variably many arguments-the twins or the triplets, the even numbers or the numbers from 1 to 10. Similarly for n-place functions, but for each place separately. A function may be both multigrade and many-valued. When taken at face value, the plural descriptive functions of Principia are of this kind: consider the squares of applied to the even numbers.
A function that can only take a single argument at a given place is singular at that place. Based on its application to the natural numbers, one might think that + is plainly singular at each place. But in the field of complex numbers + shows itself to be multigrade, as witness the equation log ab = log a + log b, bearing in mind that log is an infinitely many-valued function (one of Euler's great discoveries).
Much of this discussion of functors and functions carries over to predicates and relations. Predicates may combine with plural argument terms: 'the men are bald' (1-place), 'the reals are more numerous than the rationals' (2-place). An n-place predicate expresses an n-place relation. A 1-place relation is multigrade if it holds of variably many arguments, otherwise it is singular; similarly for n-place relations at each place separately.
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The distributive/collective distinction applies to both linguistic predicates and worldly relations. A 1-place predicate F is distributive if it is analytic that F is true of some things iff it is true of each of them; otherwise it is collective. Contrast 'smoked' (distributive) with 'wrote Principia' (collective). For n-place predicates the distinction applies to each place separately. Analogously, a 1-place relation is distributive if it holds of some things iff it holds of each of them; otherwise it is collective. For n-place relations the distinction applies to each place separately.
There is a familiar interplay between functors and predicates in which n+1-place predicates generate n-place functors via singular or plural description. For example, from a predicate expressing the relation of father to son, we can derive the descriptive functors 'the father of ', 'the fathers of ', 'the son of ' and 'the sons of '. The principal use of description in Principia is to construct such descriptive functors; there are no primitive functors.
These are the phenomena as they appear to us and, as we shall now see, to mathematicians-but not to logicians.
Mathematicians vs logicians
Although we have given plenty of examples of plural terms in everyday use, we do not apologise for emphasising mathematics. The matter is well put by Anscombe and Geach: 'It is indeed quite possible that a philosophy of logic primarily aiming at a satisfactory account of mathematical thought may be inadequate in its account of non-mathematical thought; but if a philosopher is not willing to be taught by the requirements of mathematics at all, we cannot expect his philosophy of logic to be worth much ' (1961, p. 131) . In this section we contrast the views of mathematicians and logicians about many-valued functions. On the principle that authorities should not be multiplied beyond necessity, we cite just three mathematicians: 'the master of us all', Euler; Russell's contemporary and reviewer of both the Principles and Principia, G. H. Hardy; and from last year, Roger Penrose. This notion of functional dependence of one variable upon another is perhaps the most important in the whole range of higher mathematics … we shall, in this chapter, illustrate it by means of a large number of examples. But before we proceed to do this, we must point out that the simple examples of functions mentioned above possess three characteristics which are by no means involved in the general idea of a function, viz.: (1) y is determined for every value of x; (2) to each value of x for which y is given corresponds one and only one value of y; (3) the relation between x and y is expressed by means of an analytical formula. It is indeed the case that these particular characteristics are possessed by many of the most important functions. But the consideration of the following examples will make it clear that they are by no means essential to a function. All that is essential is that there should be some relation between x and y such that to some values of x at any rate correspond values of y. … [Example 3] Let y 2 = x . Then if x is positive this equation defines two values of y corresponding to each value of x, viz. ͱ± x. (Hardy 1908, pp. 25-6) It is not immediately obvious that such an inverse to e z will necessarily exist. However, it turns out in fact that, for any complex number w, apart from 0, there always does exist z such that w = e z , so we can define log w = z. But there is a catch here: there is more than one answer. … This feature of the complex logarithm seems, at this stage, to be just an awkward irritation. However, we shall be seeing in §7.2 that it is absolutely central to some of the most powerful, useful, and magical properties of complex numbers. Complex analysis depends crucially upon it. (Penrose 2004, pp. 94-5) It is clear where these eminent mathematicians stand. What about the logicians? For the period up to the 1960s there seem to be two groups. Frege, Russell, Carnap and Church all believe that the very idea is vulnerable to an obvious objection; see section 4. Tarski, Kleene, Rosser and Quine do not object to them as such, but decide to ignore them nonetheless. Thus Tarski thinks it 'inexpedient-at least on an elementary level -to denote [many-valued functions] as functions, for this only tends to blot out the essential difference between the notion of a function and the more general one of a relation' (1941, p. 102). It does not occur to him that adding 'single-valued' would be enough to mark the difference. Rosser says 'We do not make the claim that the notion of "many-valued function" can never be of value … However, throughout the present text it is futile to try to preserve the distinction between relations and "many-valued functions", and we do not try ' (1953, p. 286) . In the same vein Quine says 'In analytical geometry and the differential calculus there is indeed point in distinguishing between socalled many-valued functions and other relations, out of considerations of continuity; but not here' (1969, p. 23). Kleene keeps his cards closer to his chest, only revealing his hand by the insertion at two points of a parenthetical 'single-valued ' (1952, pp. 32, 33) .
Skipping to the logic of the present day, one finds that the situation has changed. Many-valued functions are no longer rejected, or even considered: they are silently defined out of existence.
all that is necessary for a function-all that is 'essential to its nature'-is that it assign exactly one object to anything over which it is defined. (Beall and van Fraassen 2003, p. 16) What for Hardy was 'by no means essential to a function' has become for these authors the one thing that is 'essential to its nature'. Their introductory example is the 'familiar … positive square-root function' . His counterexample, the familiar square-root function with its two values, one positive and one negative, has been 'disappeared' . The contrast between the two camps could not be more complete.
Against many-valued functions: three types of ambiguity
The objection is always that where many-valued functions are concerned, functional value terms are ambiguous, but it comes in three very different versions according to different models for construing such terms. Although the objections are targeted at functional terms, if they work they will work against plural terms of every sort.
Russell: functional value terms are plural terms
We shall regard it as part of the meaning of a function that it is one-valued; for otherwise our symbols cease to have a definite meaning. Thus x ½ for example can only be admitted it is accompanied by a decision as to which of the square roots of x it is to denote; otherwise it is ambiguous, and therefore inadmissible. (Russell 1903a, p. 51) We can agree that 'ͱ4' is ambiguous in the sense that it denotes 2 and denotes -2, without agreeing that the ambiguity is damaging. 'F (ͱ4) Although it is true to say that 'ͱ4' denotes 2 (without mentioning -2), it is liable to mislead. If someone wants to know what is conveyed by 'The Brontë Sisters lived together' , and you say merely that 'The Brontë sisters' denotes Anne and denotes Charlotte, without mentioning Emily, you violate Grice's maxim of quantity governing cooperative conversation: 'make your contribution as informative as is required ' (1967, p. 26) . The other party will think that you believe that Anne and Charlotte are the only individuals denoted by 'The Brontë sisters', and hence that they are what 'The Brontë sisters' denotes. (Similarly, 'Brutus stabbed Caesar' is true, but that doesn't make 'Brutus' the right answer to 'Who stabbed Caesar?' . Witnesses do not just swear to tell the truth: they swear to tell 'the whole truth'. The correct answer is a list of the whole huddle of conspirators-Brutus, Casca, Cassius, Cinna, et al.-or at a pinch 'Brutus for one' .)
Frege: they are singular terms
Frege's inspired idea was to apply the notion of function to the analysis of predication and quantification. He was conscious of having extended the familiar mathematical notion, yet at the same time he was sharply critical of it ('wrong expressions … wrong thoughts'; 1904, p. 292). In particular, he rejected both partial and many-valued functions, and thus frustrated his own ambition to analyse mathematical, and more ordinary, thought and talk.
His rejection of partial functions and the empty terms they generate, is reasoned even if not reasonable. 15 His rejection of many-valued functions is harder to motivate. He was certainly well aware of them, and does not always demur. Thus in Grundlagen he explicitly describes ͱ and log as many-valued, without raising any objections (1884, sect. 96). They also appear in Begriffsschrift under the guise of 'procedures', as contrasted with 'single-valued' procedures, in his alternative rendering of 'B stands in the relation ⌿ to A' as 'B is a result of an application of the procedure ⌿ to the object A' (1879, sects 10 and 31). Elsewhere, however, he objects vehemently:
we cannot allow the sign 'ͱ4' to be equivocal … Signs must be so defined that it is determinate what 'ͱ4' means, whether it is the number 2 or some other number … The sign 'ͱ4' … has the stamp of a proper name. (1914, p. 237) Since Frege's only model of a term ('proper name' in his idiosyncratic use of that phrase) is a singular one, when he says that 'ͱ4' 'has the stamp of a proper name', he means that it should stand for one object. His response is therefore to construe 'ͱ4' as equivocal: it oscillates between the two roots. As he points out in a similar case (1881, p. 16n.), this kind of ambiguity yields contradiction: 2 = ͱ4 = Ϫ2, whence 2 = Ϫ2. Hence in the absence of a disambiguating gloss ('positive', 'negative'), 'ͱ4' is to be banned, and so with it the many-valued function for which 'ͱ' is supposed to stand.
In Grundgesetze he explains the 'logical danger' in applying the definite article:
if we wanted to form from the words 'square root of 2' the proper name 'the square root of 2' we should commit a logical error, because this proper name, in the absence of further stipulation, would be ambiguous, hence even devoid of denotation. (1893, sect. 11) He does not pause to consider plural 'the'. Someone who talks of 'the square root of 2' may indeed be committing a mathematical error, if he doesn't realize that he should be saying 'the square roots of 2' . But Frege will not allow him to correct himself. Similarly, he will not allow us to read 'ͱ4' as 'the square roots of 4' , but only as 'the square root of 4' . But on the face of it, 'ͱ4' is a term standing for the outcome of applying the function ͱ to the argument 4. Unlike 'the square root of 4' it doesn't have a singular 'stamp' unless something is said or done to give it one. It is a plural term, not an ambiguous singular one.
It should be no surprise that many-valued functions need to be handled with care if fallacies are to be avoided. Maxwell's (1959) splendid collection of fallacies in mathematics duly includes some examples. But it also includes lots of others: division by 0, naturally, but also geometrical fallacies, fallacies of differentiation, integration and limits, fallacious arguments from impossible assumptions, etc. etc. If his work has a moral, it is that all mathematics needs to be approached with caution and handled with care.
'2 = ͱ4 = Ϫ2, therefore 2 = Ϫ2' is the crudest of the fallacies involving many-valued functions. But to use it to impugn 'ͱ4' is itself a crude fallacy. Only if 'ͱ4' is, absurdly, misidentified as a singular term is the original fallacious argument forced upon us. Frege is not the only culprit here. Carnap does the same when arguing that it is only possible to replace a predicate by a functor when it expresses a many-one relation. For, he says, consider a case where each of 'Rac', 'Rbc' and 'a b' is true. If we were to introduce a functor 'k' as a surrogate for 'R', then 'k(c)' would designate indifferently either a or b and so be ambiguous. Such an ambiguity leads to contradiction: we could write 'a=k(c)' and 'b=k(c)', and hence infer 'a =b' in contradiction to our presupposition. (Abbreviated from Carnap 1958, p. 74) He has begged the question by taking for granted that 'k(c)' is a singular term.
Church: they are common names
It is the idea of a many-valued (singulary) function that, for a fixed argument, there may be more than one value of the function. If a name of the function is written, followed by a name of an argument between parentheses, the resulting expression is a common name (see footnote 6) denoting the values of the function for that argument. Though many-valued functions seem to arise naturally in the mathematical theories of real and complex numbers, objections immediately suggest themselves to the idea as just explained and are not easily overcome. (Church 1956, p. 16, n. 41) What objections? The key phrase is 'as just explained'. In the footnote he cites, Church reports Mill's idea that the general or common name 'man' denotes each man, and adds that common names in natural languages are analogous to free variables in formalized languages. He declines to say that they 'denote' things, reserving that for singular names: 'single denotation … is replaced by the possibility of various values of the variable' (p. 9). So we have two theses: a functional term is a common name, and it has various values after the manner of variables. That would make it ambiguous in the sense of being indefinite-not standing for anything in particular -rather than equivocal -trying to stand for two things at once. 'ͱ4 is positive', like 'x is positive', would fail to have any definite truth-value, which is objection enough.
But why should Church think that a plural functional term is a common name in the first place? He would himself distinguish the functional terms '+ͱ4' and 'the positive square root of 4' from the common name 'positive square root of 4' , so in the plural case he should distinguish 'ͱ4' and 'the square roots of 4' from the common name 'square roots of 4' . He appears to have conflated functional terms and common names on the basis of a vague analogy: in some sense or other, they both indicate more than one thing.
Once common names are recognized as an irrelevance, it becomes clear that the comparison between functional terms and free variables is misconceived. If we were as careful as Church usually is, we should not say 'ͱ4 is positive' but 'ͱ4 are positive' just as we say 'the square roots of 4 are positive' . The latter sentence is not indeterminate in truthvalue: it is plainly false. Church (1956, p. 16 ) says that because of the objections to them 'it is usual to replace such many-valued functions in one way or another by one-valued functions' (he includes relations as one-valued propositional functions). He lists three methods. We examine them along with two more, copying his use of 1-place functions for illustration.
Ideas for eliminating them

Replace functions by relations
Starting with the case of a single-valued f, what connection might there be between f and a (singular) 2-place relation R? The standard modern answer seems to have been first given by Peano: 'a function is a special relation, where to each value of the variable there corresponds just one value ' (1911, p. 365) .
This cannot be the whole story, however. For as Church says, 'it lies in the nature of any given function to be applicable to certain things and, when applied to one of them as argument, to yield a certain value ' (1956, p. 15) . Equally, it is in the nature of a relation that it holds or does not hold of things. No account of functions is complete without the notion value of, and no account of relations is complete without the notion holds of. Granted, identifying f with R sets up a link between these two notions: the value of f for argument x is the y such that R holds of x and y, and conversely R holds of x and y iff y is the value of f for argument x. But to be linked is not to be the same. Even if a function and a relation are identified with the same object, the role of this object qua function is quite different from its role qua relation; a difference reflected by the fact that functors and predicates belong to quite different syntactical and semantical categories.
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How does this bear on many-valued functions? Peano simply omits the restriction to many-one relations: 'For the authors who talk of a many-valued function, the word "function" is equivalent to "relation" '(1911, p. 365) . It is worth noting that the situation as between functions and relations is now completely symmetrical. Quine's 'manyvalued functions may best be referred to merely as relations ' (1969, p. 23 ) is matched by Gödel's 'relations can be thought of as many-valued functions ' (1940, p. 48) . As before, any account of functions needs to include values of (the plural now included for the obvious reason), and any account of relations needs to include holds of. As before, identifying f and R sets up a link between values of and holds of without however making them the same: the values of f for argument x are the things y such that R holds of x and y, and R holds of x and y iff y is/is one of the value/s of f for argument x.
So replacing a many-valued function by a relation does give us an alternative way of talking about its values. Instead of 'fx'or 'the values of f for argument x' we have 'the things y such that R holds of x and y' . But the objections, remember, applied to the use of plural terms, so merely replacing one such term by another is no solution at all.
Replace the many values by a set
Some mathematicians do indeed adopt this strategy. Beardon, for example, thinks it is all right because it 'does not lead to any contradiction ' (1979, p. 46) . But he can only say this because he limits himself to a particular domain, the complex numbers, whereas logicians' terms of reference demand that what they say should apply to all subject matters. The proposal is a version of what we call the 'changing-the-subject strategy', which treats an apparently plural term as a singular term standing for some single object, in this case a set. In Oliver and Smiley (2001) we show that no version of the strategy can work. Here it suffices to put a single objection. A many-valued function may map its argument to too many things to form a set, in which case they cannot be replaced in the proposed fashion. An example is the sets that have … as a member; another is the things that are not … . Multigrade examples include the generalized identity function, economically expressed by the plural functor '' .
Change the domain of arguments
Church's last method is to replace each x in the domain of a many-valued f by all the ordered pairs <x, y> for which y is one of the values of f for argument x. Then f can be replaced by the single-valued function 'the second member of ' applied to these pairs.
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Artificial though this procedure is, it works for functions that take only single arguments, for then the new domain contains sufficient information from which to reconstruct the original function. But now suppose that f is multigrade as well as many-valued. A non-mathematical example will be easiest to follow, so consider the reviewers of … 's first book. Who reviewed Principia Mathematica, Vol. I cannot be inferred from who reviewed A Treatise of Universal Algebra and who reviewed The Foundations of Geometry. So no amount of information in the shape of ordered pairs <Whitehead, y> and <Russell, y> will be any guide to the values of our f when it takes the two arguments, Whitehead and Russell. Church's procedure is thus unable to distinguish between multigrade functions that happen to coincide within the restricted territory of single arguments. It therefore fails in its purpose, because it is liable to replace different many-valued functions by the same single-valued one. He might respond by substituting {Whitehead, Russell} for Whitehead and Russell, so that his domain contains extra elements <{Whitehead, Russell}, y>. But this replacement of many arguments by single sets cannot succeed as a general strategy, for the same reason as the replacement of many values by sets, discussed above.
Other methods
Church does not mention the Fregean idea of postulating an arbitrary default value (say 0), and rightly so. For although in the case of partial 17 Church cites Riemann surfaces in support of the idea, but this is potentially very misleading. Riemann was not trying to get rid of many-valued functions, but to unify the theory of many-and one-valued analytic functions, so that results from either could be extended or applied to the other. See Riemann (1857) and Knopp (1947, sect. II, 'Multiple-valued Functions') . Moreover, the point of his construction lies in the topological interplay between a function's (continuous) singlevalued branches, but Church's procedure obliterates all talk of branches.
in the many-valued case the fact that it would equate 'log a = log b' indiscriminately with '0 = 0' speaks for itself.
The idea of exploiting the principal value of a function might seem to offer a better prospect. It depends, however, on there being some particular range of values from which the rest can be predicted, like positive square roots or the angles between 0 and 2 in trigonometry. It is hard to see how it could cover functions in general. What could be the principal grains of sand of the world's various beaches, and how could the others be predicted from them? What would be the principal members of all the diverse sets, and how could their fellow members be predicted from them?
Plural logics
We used many-valued functions as a test case in support of a number of theses about plural reference: that it needs to be taken seriously (section 3), is legitimate (section 4), and not reducible to singular reference (section 5). Here we sketch a formal framework that allows for plural reference, and use it to revisit some earlier topics. Standard practice with predicate logic is to divide it into portions representing different selections of the material, first-order logic being the weakest in expressive power, then second-order logic, and finally higher-order logic. We adopt an analogous procedure.
Minimal plural logic
The weakest system adds four novelties to the apparatus of first-order logic. (1) Plural variables: while singular variables range over individuals taken one at a time, plural variables range over any number (Ն1) of individuals taken simultaneously. (2) A logical predicate expressing the relation of inclusion, understood as covering both the inclusion of one thing among several things and the inclusion of several things among other things. We symbolize it by ՟, since identity is included as a limiting case (and is the only possibility when the term on the rhs is singular). The best English rendering of ՟ is therefore disjunctive: is/are or is/are among. (3) A plural description operator, symbolized by an infixed colon as in x:A(x), which binds a singular variable to make a plural term out of a formula. If A(x) is satisfied by one or more values of x, then x:A(x) denotes them; otherwise it is empty. (4) Predicates and functors may take plural terms as arguments, and functors may also produce plural value-terms; there may also be plural constants. As usual, the semantics assumes that there is at least one individual, though the choice of individuals is not limited to the members of a set. The distinction between singular and plural terms is semanticsingular terms cannot denote more than one thing, plural terms can. It does not need to be marked syntactically, except for variables, since in this minimal system plural variables cannot be bound.
Like first-order logic, the system is axiomatizable, and we present the axioms as an appendix to give the reader a feel for it. A completeness proof is given in Oliver and Smiley (2006) , along with a full exposition of the system. Here we merely remark on the power of the plural description operator. Standard first-order quantification is definable in terms of it, namely ᭙xA(x) is definable as x:A(x) = x:x=x, where the first '=' is understood as in the next paragraph. Contrariwise, it is not itself eliminable in favour of first-order quantification. 19 The singular description operator corresponds to the special case in which a formula is satisfiable by at most one value of x. There is therefore no strict need to include it as a separate primitive: xA(x) can be defined as
An obvious use of the system is to provide a formal framework for the expression and manipulation of many-valued functions. Fallacies are avoidable by exploiting the inclusion relation. For example, to express that 2 is one of the square roots of 4, though 2 = ͱ4 is a howler, 2՟ ͱ4 is perfectly correct. 20 Where both sides are plural terms, an equation may be appropriate, not of course using singular identity but plural identity. This is definable as reciprocal inclusion: a= b is a ՟ b ! b՟a. An illustration shows how closely this reflects informal mathematical practice:
The function Log z satisfies the equation Log (z 1 z 2 ) = Log z 1 + Log z 2 , that is to say every value of either side of this equation is one of the values of the other side. (Hardy 1908, p. 384) 
Full plural logic
The minimal logic seems to be adequate for a great deal of workaday mathematics. For example, it can express Principia's plural descriptive functions: 'the squares of the odd numbers' becomes x:᭚y(x=y 2 ! y is odd). It cannot however represent 'the men who wrote Principia' with its intractably collective predicate. 'x: x wrote Principia' is empty, since no single things satisfy the predicate.
To do justice to the wider range of plural descriptions requires moving to the next stage, in which plural variables can occur bound. As with second-order logic, however, the extra expressive strength is gained at the expense of axiomatizability. Using bold letters for plural variables for expository purposes, we now have formulas of the form ᭙xA and ᭚xA, and we can carry over the semantics of the operator by analogy from singular to plural variables. That is, xA(x) will denote some things just in case they satisfy A(x) and no other rival things do so. 'The men who wrote Principia' becomes x(x wrote Principia).
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(The numerically specific cases of section 2 can be dealt with in the same way by inserting a clause that exactly n things are included among x.) Our original plural description operator now corresponds to a special case of the new one: x:A(x) need not now be taken as primitive, since it is definable as y᭙x(A(x) v x՟y). This nicely takes care of 'the Fs' for distributive F, where it would be an error to use the bare xFx. Likewise for numerically specific 'the n Fs' for distributive F.
Readers might expect that plural will be eliminable, by analogy with Russell's contextual definition of singular or the plural versions of it in section 1.2. They would be wrong. The proof turns on the notion of a co-partial function.
22 Just as partial functions may map some things onto nothing, co-partial functions may map nothing onto some things. We have already mentioned the obvious many-valued example, namely the 'complement' function the things that are not … or more colloquially everything but … The things that are not the present King of France are all the things there are. Everything but the present Consuls of Rome is everything.
If co-partial functions are taken into account, the description operator is not eliminable. For let F be a primitive predicate and f a primitive 21 Here we take issue with Sharvy's 'more general theory of plural descriptions ' (1980) . In our notation, his proposal is to reduce 'The Fs G' to ᭚x(Fx ! ᭙y(Fy t y՟x) ! Gx). But this does not work for collective F. Consider for example 'The men who between them solved the equation did not use Gauss's method'. Suppose Tom and Dick between them solved the equation using Gauss's method, while Tom, Dick and Harry between them solved it by a different method and no one else solved it at all. We think that on the natural reading the test sentence is false, but Sharvy's proposal makes it come out true. If we are right, his claim that 'the primary use of "the" is not to indicate uniqueness. Rather, it is to indicate totality' (p. 623) does not stand up. 22 It is an abbreviated plural version of the proof of non-eliminability of singular in Smiley (2004, sect. IV) . Even for the range of contexts in which it is eliminable, he stresses the difference between genuine eliminability from a formal system of logic and what is offered in 'On Denoting' or Principia, for Russell's point was precisely the denial that there can be a legitimate logic containing in the first place, and it is impossible to state, let alone prove, an equivalence of which one side is missing.
functor, and consider the sentence F (f( x(x x)) ). Since f may for all we know express a co-partial function, the fact that the description is empty does not imply that f( x(x x)) is empty too. We therefore cannot infer anything about the truth-value of our sentence, unlike F( x(x x)) with its empty subject, and the equivalence between it and the logically false ᭚y(᭙x(x x v x=y) ! F(f(y))) breaks down, leaving nothing to put in its place.
Higher-level plural logic
Full plural logic is a vehicle for expressing some of what Russell needed to say about classes as many 'in spite of the apparent logical difficulty ' (1903c, p. 516) . He required 'a sense for diversity of collections, meaning thereby, apparently, if u and v are the collections in question, that xʦu and xʦv are not equivalent for all values of x' (p. 516). Remembering that xʦu will mean 'x is one of the u's' (p. 516), 23 his sense for diversity can be expressed using plural =. The men who wrote Principia Mathematica are not the men who wrote Grundlagen der Mathematik. In symbols, xFx xGx. We can also agree that a class as many is 'one in one sense and many in another ' (p. 76) . Within full plural logic we can define plural numerically specific existential quantifiers by replacing singular by plural variables in the standard definitions of ᭚ n x. The men who wrote Principia are one in this sense: ᭚ 1 y(y = xFx). Yet the men who wrote Principia are two individuals as well. This is expressible using a singular numerical quantifier, as ᭚ 2 x(x՟ xFx). There is no contradiction, and hence no problem of the one and the many.
If F is 'are joint authors of multivolume treatises on logic', ᭚ 2 xFx is true, since the predicate is true of Whitehead and Russell, and of Hilbert and Bernays, and -let us suppose -no other rival things. Since we can count these couples, we would expect to be able to refer to them both at once. Carrying over the semantics of the : operator by analogy from singular to plural variables gives x:Fx. In Russell's words, it stands for 'many many's' (p. 516) -not four men, but a couple of couples. It is therefore a plural term of second level, higher than x:Fx.
We have now entered the murky waters of higher-level plural logic. Second-level plural terms will naturally be accompanied by secondlevel plural variables which will be bound by second-level plural quantifiers and second-level . Third-level plural terms can then be created 23 In thus equating u with the u's, Russell surely drew inspiration from Peano: 'la formule indique la classe des "x qui satisfont à la condition p". On peut lire le signe par le mot "les x, lesquels"' (1897, p. 30). This list represents a default option in which constants are plural and potentially empty unless otherwise stipulated, functors stand for potentially many-valued functions unless otherwise stipulated, and predicates are collective unless stipulated to be distributive. To make a constant a singular, add an axiom ᭙x(x՟a t x=a), and to ensure its non-emptiness add E!a, short for ᭚x(x՟a). Single-valuedness conditions on functions can be imposed in a similar fashion. To make a predicate F distributive, add an axiom scheme E!a t (Fa v ᭙x(x՟a t Fx), where x is not free in a, or its n-place analogue.
